SECRET
44C/GS/CP

Singapore

May 1973

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SUPVEY

SECRET

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200090008-8

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS

The basic unit of the NIS is the *General Survey*, which is now published in a bound-by-chapter format so that topics of greater perishability can be updated on an individual basis. These chapters—Country Profile, The Society, Government and Politics, The Economy, Military Geography, Transportation and Telecommunications, Armed Forces, Science, and Intelligence and Security, provide the primary NIS coverage. Some chapters, particularly Science and Intelligence and Security, that are not pertinent to all countries, are produced selectively. For small countries requiring only minimal NIS treatment, the *General Survey* coverage may be bound into one volume.

Supplementing the *General Survey* is the NIS *Basic Intelligence Factbook*, a ready reference publication that semiannually updates key statistical data found in the Survey. An unclassified edition of the factbook omits some details on the economy, the defense forces, and the intelligence and security organizations.

Although detailed sections on many topics were part of the NIS Program, production of these sections has been phased out. Those previously produced will continue to be available as long as the major portion of the study is considered valid.

A quarterly listing of all active NIS units is published in the *Inventory of Available NIS Publications*, which is also bound into the concurrent classified Factbook. The Inventory lists all NIS units by area name and number and includes classification and date of issue; it thus facilitates the ordering of NIS units as well as their filing, cataloging, and utilization.

Initial dissemination, additional copies of NIS units, or separate chapters of the *General Surveys* can be obtained directly or through liaison channels from the Central Intelligence Agency.

The *General Survey* is prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency under the general direction of the NIS Committee. It is coordinated, edited, published, and disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency.

WARNING

The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be released or shown to representatives of any foreign government or international body except by specific authorization of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1.

For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the portions so marked may be made available for official purposes to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel provided no attribution is made to National Intelligence or the National Intelligence Survey.

Subsections and graphics are individually classified according to content. Classification/control designations are:

(U/OU) . . Unclassified/For Official Use Only
(C) . . . . . Confidential
(S) . . . . . Secret

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200090008-8

GENERAL SURVEY CHAPTERS

COUNTRY PROFILE Integrated perspective of the subject country • Chronology • Area brief • Summary map

THE SOCIETY Social structure • Population • Living and working conditions • Religion • Education • Artistic expression • Public information • Glossary

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS Governmental strength and stability • Structure and function • Political dynamics • National policies • Threats to stability • The police • Intelligence and security • Countersubversion and counterinsurgency capabilities • Chronology • Glossary

THE ECONOMY Appraisal of the economy • Its structure—agriculture, fisheries, forestry, fuels and power, metals and minerals, manufacturing and construction • Domestic trade • Economic policy and development • Money and banking • Manpower • International economic relations • Glossary

TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS Appraisal of systems • Strategic mobility • Railroads • Highways • Ports • Merchant marine • Civil air • Airfields • The telecom system

MILITARY GEOGRAPHY Topography and climate • Military geography • Strategic area • Internal routes • Approaches: land, sea, air

ARMED FORCES The defense establishment • Activities • Ground forces • Naval forces • Air forces • Paramilitary

This General Survey supersedes the one dated July 1968, copies of which should be destroyed.

Country Profile: SINGAPORE

This Country Profile was prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency. Research was substantially completed by January 1973.

SECRET

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200090008-8



Success of a City-State

"What is required is a rugged, resolute, highly trained, highly disciplined community. Create such a community and you will survive and prosper here for thousands of years."

Lee Kuan Yew

The story of Singapore in the early 1970's is a story of success. The people of Singapore have worked hard during their brief decade of independence and now enjoy economic prosperity, effective government, and modern social services. Yet events might very easily have turned out otherwise, for Singapore seemed an unlikely candidate for successful nationhood. This island is crowded, lacking in natural resources, and potentially vulnerable to many sorts of stresses and pressures. It is a small nation—225 square miles, 2 million people—somewhat smaller in size and larger in population than the part of the Washington, D.C. area that is enclosed by the Capital Beltway. Physically it is a part of the Malay Peninsula—actually an island joined to the mainland by a causeway—and its expulsion in 1965 from Malaysia gave rise to a sense of isolation and vulnerability. (U/OU)

In the population of Singapore, potentially explosive cultural differences separate the large Chinese majority (76%) from the minority Malays (15%) and Indians (7%). Racial tensions were intensified by the chronically high unemployment. This seemed destined to increase in 1971 after the departure of the British military forces (as part of the general withdrawal from bases east of Suez), which were contributing about 18% of the total gross national product (GNP) of Singapore. Then the outbreak in 1969 of communal violence in neighboring Malaysia cast doubt on the stability of the entire Malay Peninsula and threatened the city-state's campaign to attract foreign investment capital, develop new industries, and ease the impact of British withdrawal. (U/OU)

In spite of gloomy forecasts, Singapore has not only survived but has moved forward from one good year to another. The port of Singapore has become the fourth largest in the world, surpassing that of London. Singapore is already the center in Southeast Asia for trade, banking, oil exploration, and oil refining, and is on the way to becoming the center for electronics, precision equipment, electric appliances, and shipbuilding. The favorable climate for industrial investment has brought American, Japanese, and European investors swarming into Singapore. By mid-1972 unemployment was down to less than 36,000, and about 70,000 "guest workers" had been imported—mostly from Malaysia—to fill available jobs. Government economists have pointed out that if economic growth were to continue at its 1968-71 rate, Singapore would reach the per capita GNP in 1977 that the United Kingdom had reached in 1970. (U/OU)

Singapore's extremely effective and honest government is a tribute to the determination and



The Causeway

political skills of Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, the grandson of a Chinese immigrant. He is the outstanding political figure to develop in Southeast Asia among the Overseas Chinese—a people traditionally much more interested in business than in politics. Lee was educated in the English-language schools of Singapore and then at Cambridge, where he graduated first in his class at law school. After returning to Singapore in 1950, Lee began to work with radical labor and student groups. By 1954 he was legal adviser to more than 100 trade unions, and he was emerging as the obvious leader of the English-educated Chinese. He studied the languages of Singapore until eventually he could deliver his speeches not only in English but also in Malay, Mandarin, and Hokkien (his ancestral dialect). In 1959, at 35, Lee became Prime Minister—tough and ready to tackle any problems. (U/OU)

Singapore's success has been created by its industrious people, led by the astute Lee. They have a scrupulous, almost puritanical government; even the political opposition admits the lack of corruption in the government. Describing itself as democratic socialist—although not exactly either democratic or socialistic in the traditional sense—the government has made remarkable progress in developing new industry, in expanding education and technical training, and in establishing efficient programs of medical care and public housing. The people have responded with hard work and high productivity. They appear to agree with Lee that "what is required is a rugged, resolute, highly trained, highly disciplined community. Create such a community and you will survive and prosper here for thousands of years." (U/OU)

Singapore's continued success is not an absolute certainty, however, for the country has many immediate and potential problems. One view of the external threats sees Singapore as an island of Chinese in a sea of Malays, and the idea is valid enough to make Singapore's leaders cautious in dealing with their Malay neighbors. Internal racial conflict is an equally serious danger; language, religion, and culture separate the Indians and Malays of Singapore from the majority Chinese. Singapore's leaders believe that the nation's future depends mainly on whether its multiracial, but predominantly Chinese, population can develop a sense of national identity. Such a development would help allay the suspicions of their Malay neighbors in Indonesia and Malaysia, who view Singapore as an unwelcome and untrustworthy center of Chinese influence. (U/OU)



Singapore's religious edifices reflect the cultural diversity of the population

Singapore is one of several large modern cities that developed under colonial rule in the Far East – metropolises with all the features of modern European cities, surrounded by the traditional Asian countryside. To such cities as Singapore, Djakarta, Saigon, Cholon, and Manila came people from many countries; of particular significance, however, were the Chinese, who came in large numbers, worked hard, and eventually dominated commercial life. Most governments in the area have tried since gaining independence to limit the commercial power of the Overseas Chinese, and their activities have been severely restricted in many parts of Southeast Asia. Among these modern Asian metropolises, Singapore is

unique in that it has become an independent, Chinese-dominated city-state, separated from the large surrounding territories.

Established 150 years ago as a trading post of the British East Indian Company, Singapore grew and prospered as the British Empire's anchor in Southeast Asia. Its greatest strength was the gift of geography: at the tip of the Malay Peninsula, it commanded the Strait of Malacca, the maritime passage between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. There Sir Stamford Raffles developed the British entrepot for Southeast Asia—the center for collection and distribution of the region's products and of manufactured goods to the markets of the region.

From the beginning Singapore attracted immigrants from all over the Orient. It developed as a city of transients—mostly Chinese men who came to scrape together money to send home—but gradually this changed; women came to Singapore, family life became more usual, and people began to settle down. By World War II most of the residents had been born in Singapore, and they had begun to develop the feeling that Singapore was their home.

Culturally the people of Singapore are surprisingly diverse, even more than is reflected in the usual generalization that they include 76% Chinese, 15% Malays, 7% Indians, and 2% others. The "others" include Eurasians, Europeans, and Ceylonese; "Indians" include Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims from many parts of former British India; "Malays," or their parents, came from Malaya, Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi, and other islands of the Malay Archipelago. Among the Chinese, important cultural differences separate those educated in Chinese-language (Mandarin) schools and those educated in English. The major communities, still loyal to their cultural traditions, tend to be psychologically isolated from each other, although they are learning to live together in the high-rise public housing of modern Singapore.

The government's drive to create a separate Singaporean identity has prompted it to push, in practical ways, the development of an English-educated Westernized society. English is already the most widely used language in Singapore. Parents can choose the classroom language in which their children will be taught, and in 1970 about 62% were choosing English. Although schools are available in the other three official languages—Chinese (Mandarin), Malay, and Tamil—in those schools English is the required second language. Study of a second official language is compulsory and of a third is encouraged. Increasing attention is being given to bilingual or "integrated" schools, in which some subjects (generally technical and scientific) are taught in English and some in Chinese or Malay.

Of the minority groups, the Malays as the most numerous are the most likely to be a significant problem in Singapore. They consider themselves the original inhabitants of the area, and some resent the success of the interlopers. Economically the Malays tend to be near the bottom of the ladder, and though they are making progress educationally and economically, the gap between them and the Chinese seems to widen. The government goes out of its way to avoid charges of discrimination. After Singapore's separation from Malaysia in 1965, Lee was able to overcome the fears of many Singapore Malays—that they would become second-class citizens in a Chinese-dominated Singapore—by pushing through governmental measures to protect their position, such as equal employment and citizenship guarantees and special educational grants.

The government's even-handed racial policy, combined with the general economic prosperity in which all groups share, has so far enabled Singapore to avoid serious outbreaks of communal violence. However, a serious outbreak of racial warfare in neighboring Malaysia—where the Malays outnumber the Chinese—could easily spill over into Singapore, and the possibility of such strife is a recurrent nightmare of Singapore's leaders.

Any long-term view of Singapore must take into account the fact that its 1.6 million Chinese inhabitants are a part of the 13 million Overseas Chinese of Southeast Asia. The Chinese have shown remarkably little inclination to mix with other races; some still accept the old dictum that descendants through the male line are Chinese forever. There has been widespread envy and dislike of the Chinese businessmen who have dominated economic life; just as important has been the fear of Peking's potential for influence and subversion through the medium of the Overseas Chinese. Whether their loyalty has shifted permanently from their ancestral to their present home

is one of the most persistent and fundamental questions in Southeast Asia. In Singapore no policy has been given higher priority than that of building a multiracial society with a sense of national identity, with emphasis on transforming the ethnic Chinese, with their secret societies and factions, into citizens of Singapore.

The Chinese population of Singapore has within it two distinct groups—those who have grown up with the traditional Chinese language and culture and those whose English-language education has created cultural and emotional ties with the West. Between the groups are continuing differences in customs, values, prejudices, and tastes, in educational standards, income levels, and areas of residence, and even in recreation. The first group outnumbers the second by about two to one, and the government's control of Singapore depends on support from both.

Many wealthy, respected Chinese families retain a strong feeling of attachment to China and are proud of Chinese civilization. Large parts of the commercial world of Singapore are still the preserve of the Chinese educated, who have by and large maintained their dialects and customs. Their way of life and conduct of business matters are still essentially Chinese. From those families came the men who in earlier years organized the Singapore Chamber of Commerce into a political pressure group, and who still support the activities of a number of exclusively Chinese associations and schools. Perhaps they even find repugnant some aspects of life in present-day Singapore, but they share with the English educated a vested interest in further strengthening Singapore's Western-oriented society.

Prime Minister Lee and most of the political and professional elite are English educated (Lee himself only learned to speak Mandarin Chinese after he went into politics, when it became a political necessity), and most of them have Western styles of behavior and values. Insofar as there is a distinct sense of a "Singaporean" national identity, it is found among this group much more than among the Chinese oriented. The government has pushed this Western orientation.

The leadership has often said that it considers English the most logical common language for a multiracial society in Singapore, and the best jobs require knowledge of English. The Chinese educated have benefited like everyone else from Singapore's general prosperity, but those who lack English find themselves handicapped in many fields.

The proportions of the two groups are shifting. More than half of the ethnic Chinese in Singapore are under 21, and most of the young Chinese are now being educated in the English-language schools, so very soon the majority will have had the English education. But this does not signal the coming elimination of the firmly rooted Chinese cultural traditions; in fact, the younger generations in both school systems show a rising interest in their Chinese cultural roots. Despite the fact that the China-born generation is gradually dying off and that more young people seek an English language education, Singapore remains very much a Chinese city, and the gravitational pull of China continues to be strong.

The government takes a hard line against Chinese chauvinism. Periodically it cracks down on the Chinese-language press of Singapore for glorifying life in mainland China and criticizing government policies in Singapore. Despite the expanding contacts with China, there is no sign that the government will countenance displays of pro-Peking sentiment or allow unbridled criticism of Lee's policies.

In pushing the Western style of education, the English-educated leaders often appear to disparage



Nanyang University

things Chinese, stirring up resentment among many of the Chinese educated, who feel they are regarded as inferior. This makes them receptive to arguments that in order to attract investment the government willingly sacrifices the interests of the Chinese working man to those of foreign investors. Singapore's leaders have begun to move strongly to forestall a breakdown in communication between them and this critical base of support. The majority of the ruling party candidates in the 1972 general election were Chinese educated. In addition, the government is recruiting an increasing number of graduates of Nanyang University (Singapore's Chinese university) into the civil service and into the semigovernmental associations.

One-Party Democracy (u/ou)

Lee Kuan Yew

Singapore is one of the rare former colonies where institutions of representative government have proved durable. A British style of government with full adult suffrage was adopted before independence and has endured successfully the transition to independence. Every 4 or 5 years since 1959 there has been a general election, at which every adult citizen must vote or be subject to a fine. The People's Action Party (PAP), led by Lee Kuan Yew, has dominated every election, and Lee has been the only Prime Minister. The sheer efficiency of his government has helped establish a climate unfavorable to the growth of opposition political movements, although suppression of radical elements in the early 1960's has also contributed to this situation. The party occasionally seems slightly embarrassed by its political monopoly and pays lipservice to the benefits of a "loyal opposition," but it shows no intention of loosening its hold. In the election of September 1972, People's Action swept all 65 seats in Parliament. Even so, the opposition parties won some 30% of the popular vote, indicating that not everyone in Singapore is content under Lee's paternalistic rule.





incompatible with the Chinese work ethic needed to keep Singapore prosperous.

The voters of Chinese descent on Singapore are mainly concerned with making a living, and most of them still shy away from involvement in government. Traditionally they have been accustomed to law that protects the state rather than the individual, and they expect a good government to rule firmly. When 18 men were hanged in 1966 for killing two Singapore prison officials there was no public criticism. The men had killed state employees and destroyed state property, and the populace believed the state was entitled to forfeits. For them, Lee provides a strong, effective government that is good for business.

Thoroughly Westernized liberals find Lee's style of leadership most distasteful, but they are few and exercise only limited political leverage. They criticize the People's Action Party mainly because it has failed to create liberal democracy and a genuine multi-party system. The government, for its part, defends its infringement of civil liberties as a necessary evil in a developing nation that has sensitive social problems and is threatened by subversion. Most Singaporeans accept that argument, and even those who most strongly deplore government censorship and regimentation still praise the rest of the party's policies.

Increasing signs of disenchantment in the English-educated community nevertheless represent a change in the political situation. A striking example came in the summer of 1971, when Lee closed down a local English-language newspaper, and over 15,000 citizens signed a petition protesting the action. The depth of their dissatisfaction, which surprised both the government and outside observers, suggests that the eventual development of a moderate opposition party may not be completely out of the question.

Socialism and Laissez-faire (u/ou)

When independence arrived, the new government realized that the economy of Singapore must be reshaped. Each year some 25,000 young people finished school and started looking for jobs. Unemployment was high, the population growth rate was one of the highest in the world, and the economy, based on entrepot trade and servicing the British bases, was expanding too slowly. Prime Minister Lee and his advisers settled down to preparation of a general program for economic development, well aware that survival as a nation depended on their success.

Singapore's chance of independent survival looked particularly gloomy when one considered its meager physical resources. The city-state occupies one main island (26 by 14 miles) and more than 40 small ones—none with any resources to speak of. Much of the land is low lying, originally swamp and jungle, and the city itself is built mainly on land reclaimed from swamp and sea. Agriculture, on one-fifth of the total land, produces a little commercial rubber and only a fraction of the food the country needs. No mineral resources are evident, except for construction materials—clay, sand, gravel, and stone. Fishing grounds are exploited, but the fishing is not of much economic significance. Reservoirs in the hilly, wooded central part of the island provide less than half of the city's water needs; the rest comes by pipeline across the causeway from Malaysia. The small islands are mostly unpopulated, but a few are used as sites for a tin smelter, oil refineries, bulk petroleum storage, a quarantine station, and a civil detention center; the workers commute by ferry. Even the monotonously predictable heat—in the 70's at night and in the middle and upper 80's during the day—and the humid weather of this equatorial area make it difficult for human beings to function efficiently. The rainfall is frequent and heavy all year round. The effect of the hot, damp climate on human efficiency has reportedly been a matter of considerable concern to Prime Minister Lee and other high-level planners.

Singapore's poverty in physical resources merely emphasizes its genuine assets: its hard-working, adaptable population, its resourceful leadership, its location at the crossroads of Southeast Asia, and its inheritance from the colonial period. That period established excellent port facilities; an international airport; sound commercial, financial, and trading institutions; a stable currency; and an adequate communications systems.

In economic planning, the government gave top priority to programs for stimulating foreign investment from the advanced industrial nations. Full employment, even if the population growth could be slowed down, would require a high rate of economic expansion, which in turn would require capital and advanced technology not available at Singapore. The fact that this would involve planning and supervising a large-scale buildup of capitalistic enterprise did not disturb the socialist leaders of Singapore, who were interested in results rather than ideology.

The Economic Development Board (EDB) was established in 1961, with power to develop industrial

parks and to offer incentives to prospective new industries or expanding old industries. At the end of the first 5-year economic program, in 1966, about 10% of the labor force was still unemployed, and the government decided to intensify its efforts. The EDB opened offices in major financial centers around the world—all promoting Singapore's investment image. The Development Bank of Singapore was founded to provide long-term financing, and the International Trading Company Ltd. was established to search out new foreign markets. Alluring fiscal incentives were publicized: some types of industry were freed of all taxes (including those on dividends) for up to 5 years; under accelerated depreciation a company might be able to write off its plant within a year; and every dollar spent abroad on advertising could bring a $2 tax rebate.

New labor laws, as enticing as the fiscal incentives from the employer's point of view, went into effect in 1968. An American businessman is reported to have said, "If I had been assigned to write the Singapore labor ordinances, I couldn't have done a better job for my company." Management has the right to hire, fire, and transfer at will; the right to strike is severely limited, and wage increases are tied to productivity. This is in line with Prime Minister Lee's goal of a "lean and rugged society." Lee has said, "When we talk of leanness, it means that we carry no passengers. Every single person in Singapore now . . . must either pull his weight or he deserves what he will get. . . . Unless you dispel this belief that the world owes us a living, then none of our other problems will even begin to be solved." Most of the workers in the new industries are of Chinese descent, born to this demanding work ethic, and they appear to accept it.

In response, the investment world has beaten a path to the door of the Economic Development Board, manufacturing has boomed, and the finance, trading, and service industries of Singapore have all prospered to such an extent that the real economic growth since 1968 has averaged about 14% per year. Foreign investment in manufacturing totaled about US$200 million in early 1970; by late 1971 it had reached $628 million, and new investors continue to swarm into town. Dozens of high-technology firms from Western Europe, Japan, and the United States are investing in Singapore. For example, *Roilei-Werke* of West Germany has committed itself to invest about US$50 million by 1980 in plants that will produce cameras, projectors, and other photographic equipment for the world market. Philips of the Netherlands has invested about $23 million in four factories—said by a Philips spokesman to mark "the first time we are setting up factories of this degree of sophistication outside of Holland." Modern industrial zones and towns are being created around Singapore island. The largest, Jurong in the southwestern part of the island, has more than 300 factories built on about 10 square miles of reclaimed swamp and hill land, and a large industrial port has been carved out of the Jurong shoreline.

The remarkable success of the investment program now permits careful screening of proposed new enterprises. Enough labor-intensive factories have gone into operation for the government to begin to concentrate on attracting sophisticated, science-oriented industries like aerospace, scientific equipment, advanced electronics, and metal engineering. The Economic Development Board has denied, however, that it is switching attention from labor-intensive to capital-intensive industries. Finance Minister Hon Sui Sen said in 1972, "It's not really capital we're interested in, although if it's going to be a very capital-intensive investment we would certainly welcome it. It's the expertise we are really looking for."

While the manufacturing sector has been leading the economic growth, the traditional role of Singapore as the entrepot and hub of commerce in Southeast Asia has not been neglected. Even if it is not entirely a free port as in the days of Sir Stamford Raffles, the port of Singapore maintains a free-trade zone that includes most of the dockyard and that allows shippers and importers to assemble, process, repackage, and display and sell their goods. Each year the volume of traffic increases. The surprisingly small harbor (being constantly enlarged) makes up for what it lacks in size with the efficiency of its dockhands, who run a 24-hour-a-day service with no breaks for holidays. This industrious and flexible work force is the best insurance for the future of the port of Singapore.

The massive economic dislocation created by the British military withdrawal (in early 1967, before withdrawal began, the British employed 54,000



Shipbuilding and repair facilities

Singaporeans, and they had been spending more than US$150 million a year) has been swallowed up by the booming economy. Only a fraction of the military facilities were taken over by the new integrated Australian/New Zealand/UK (ANZUK) Joint Force, which remains in the northern part of Singapore island. The rest of the facilities were converted to civilian use. Most of the Royal Naval Dockyard was converted into the commercial Sembawang Shipyard, which has floating docks, a 100,000-ton dry dock, and a mile of deep water berths. The Normantown Oil Fuel Depot is being run by the Port of Singapore Authority for the bunkering of merchant ships instead of warships, and formerly British-held lands and buildings in Kent Ridge are to form the nucleus of new campuses for the University of Singapore and the Singapore Polytechnic Institute. The British contributed US$120 million in aid to cover costs of conversion of facilities, new machinery and equipment, grants to unemployed, and vocational training; this was enough to counteract the withdrawal pains.

Adding impetus to the economic boom have been two economic windfalls that could not have been anticipated by the government planners. These are the oil boom in Southeast Asia and the American activities in Indochina. Oil has brought a number of refineries to Singapore, and dozens of oil-exploration companies have established bases there for their field operations in Southeast Asia. The Vietnam conflict boosted Singapore's economy—more travelers stopping off there, more ship-repair work, more sales of manufactured items—but the effect cannot be accurately measured.

Welfare That's Good for Business (u/ou)



The democratic socialist government stands committed to the idea of increasing the living standards and the social security of the common man, but approaches these goals in its characteristic manner. Prime Minister Lee has said that it must be "prudent on the purely welfare projects which do not increase our economic growth. . . ." The government concentrates its spending on education, medical care, and housing. Education has top priority, on the basis that the population must be educated and trained in the disciplines and techniques of a modern industrial society. A productive society must be a healthy society, so public health services and hospital care are heavily subsidized. Public low-cost housing programs also have an economic justification—they help keep down Singapore's labor cost.

Indeed, Singapore is short of skilled labor and technicians, and during recent years the leaders have been almost obsessed with education and training. Educational opportunity has been expanded at all levels, including adult education, and the literacy rate rose from 52% in 1957 to an estimated 70% in 1970. The whole educational system has been tilted toward technology, and private industry lays considerable emphasis on training employees to higher levels of expertise. Since 1968 additional vocational institutes have been established, and joint industry-government programs provide on-the-job training and even special training overseas in European, American, and Japanese factories and schools. Demand for skilled people has been increasing faster than the supply, and each year 450 to 500 more engineers will need to be imported, at least until 1975. The new industries compete with each other for the specialized labor pool by offering special bonuses and incentives. In 1970 the government eased immigration restrictions to make it easier for skilled persons to come in.

High-rise public housing is intended to replace the old quarters of Singapore, where each ethnic group had its own neighborhoods. The crowded warrens are being razed, and as the people leave their shacks or dilapidated tenements they move to high-rise blocks where all ethnic types are jumbled together. The government hopes that as Singapore is modernized, its people will lose their communal loyalties and become increasingly committed to the city-state. The Singaporeans are already accustomed to crowding, and most of them appear to adapt to the crowded life

in the high-rise flats, but there have been some indications of increased psychological problems among them.

More than 37% of the population lived in high-rise public housing by the end of 1971, and it is planned that eventually 70% of the people will live in such apartments. Most of the high-rises have been built in great clumps as satellite towns at Queenstown and Toa Payoh and in industrial zones such as Jurong. The buildings rise 10 to 20 stories or even, in a few cases, to 40 stories, and all have electricity, gas, water, and sewer facilities. They are not particularly attractive, although the newer ones are improved over the early ones—better looking, with larger shopping centers, playgrounds, and gardens. Low-income families can rent an "efficiency" flat—one big room plus kitchen, bath, lavatory, and balcony—for as little as US$7 per month. These are for the very poor. For the families that can afford them, flats with two, three, or four rooms are available at considerably higher rents. Any of the flats may be bought at moderate prices—with a long-term mortgage and no down payments. This policy is intended to give the residents a financial interest in the economy and an incentive to take care of the flats, and early in the 1970's nearly a third of the flats had already been sold.

The rapid growth of population threatened the stability of Singapore during the early days of independence, and the government launched a massive program against it. Contraceptives, voluntary sterilizations, and abortions were made available; the area has been saturated with propaganda in favor of family planning, and government-controlled radio and television publicize the advantages of a small family. Almost all births occur in government hospitals, a fact that simplifies direct communication with the mothers about child care and birth control. For the first confinement the hospital charge is about the equivalent of US$3.50, for the second $7.00, for the third $17.50, and for the fourth and subsequent

confinements $35.00. Delivery charges are waived for women who volunteer also to undergo sterilization. Women who have already given birth to three children are no longer eligible for paid maternity leave, and large families are not given priority for low-cost public housing. As a result of all this, the birth rate fell from 42 per thousand in 1958 to 22 in 1970, and the net growth rate dropped to a manageable 1.7%.

In practice, the social welfare effort of the Singapore Government has not created a system as complete as that of Great Britain or Sweden. In Singapore there are still a number of aspects of social security for which the state does not take responsibility. The law sets no minimum wage, for example, and the government provides no overall system of old age pensions. Perhaps this is partly because the Overseas Chinese have always had to look out for themselves and have highly developed talents for setting up mutual-protection societies. Probably most important, however, has been the government's relentless preoccupation with the business of laying the economic base for broader development.

A Triumphant Future (s)



Design for Southeast Asia's tallest building

Singapore has been called a cultural desert, because no distinctive Singaporean culture has emerged, yet the art forms of many cultures flourish there: Chinese opera, Malay shadow plays, Indian classical dancing, and dozens of other specialties of the diverse cultural backgrounds of the people. The government encourages those, but the pervasive modern American and European films, music, books, and magazines are feared as a threat to the Singapore way of life, and some of them are banned. The multiracial society has gone a considerable distance already in developing a national identity, but it has yet to be translated into art and literature.

The government's ubiquitous guidance of life in the city-state seems certain to continue. The People's Action Party can be expected to dominate the political scene for the next several years, at least. There are Singaporeans of all races, and particularly the young, who criticize its autocratic and often arrogant methods, but there is no sign of significant widespread popular disaffection. And the party shows no sign of growing fat and lazy with success. Its leaders have taken pains to seek out new talent and are apparently already putting together a "shadow cabinet" of younger men who will be ready to take over and lead Singapore through the 1980's. Lee has talked of withdrawing by 1978, when he will be 54; but his prime imperative is to make Singapore's independent

existence politically and economically secure, and so long as the region remains turbulent, he is unlikely to relinquish his position. He will certainly not do so voluntarily until he feels confident that a fresh generation of leaders has emerged, as able and single-minded as his own has been. Strong replacements are available in the cabinet, however, and Lee's sudden death would probably not seriously weaken the government.

The economic strategy that has succeeded so spectacularly is hardly likely to change much in the near future. Singapore continues to attract foreign investment, and manufacturing and tourism are increasing in importance, while entrepot trade increases less rapidly. The emphasis on sophisticated industries that has led to an actual shortage of highly trained workers means that more specialists and technicians have to be recruited from other countries. The selection of Singapore as the headquarters of the Asian Dollar Market bolsters its strength as regional financial center. So long as wage rates remain competitive with those in Hong Kong and Tokyo, the economic growth rate of Singapore is likely to continue its rapid increase, although perhaps at a rate lower than the 14% increase in GNP during 1968-71.

The future Singapore is being blueprinted by the nation's planning offices, with assistance from foreign planners. The objectives are many: zero population growth, pollution control, computerization, restructuring the educational system to emphasize the technical, upgrading of all skills, and more and more emphasis on research and development and all types of "brain services"—engineering, physical planning and development, marketing, international sales and service, and banking and finance. Within a few years the planners would like to convert Singapore into the "brain center," research center, and convention center of Asia.

The Straits of Malacca and Singapore, of which Singapore is the key port, are of economic and strategic interest to many nations, and controversy over control of this passage between the Pacific and Indian Oceans has developed into a sensitive international issue. Japan is vitally concerned, being dependent on Persian Gulf oil brought through the straits in its large oil tankers (up to 200,000-ton tankers can use the straits safely). Malaysia and Indonesia, with their claims of 12-mile territorial seas, have challenged the traditional view of the narrow straits as international waterways, although they recognize the principle of innocent passage for international shipping. Singapore prefers maximum use of the straits by world shipping and still considers them international waterways, but it joins with Malaysia and Indonesia in declaring that the three littoral countries will assume exclusive responsibility for safety of navigation in the straits. Responsibility obviously must be fixed for traffic control in the narrowest sections, for dredging when it is needed at the shallowest areas, and for handling oil spills and other forms of pollution. Singapore and other nations will discuss such issues as these in a world context at the 1973 U.N. Law of the Sea Conference.

With the withdrawal of British military forces (only a small ANZUK joint force remains), Lee decided that Singapore should be able to provide its own protection. He is doubtful of the effectiveness of the Five Power Defense Arrangement, the loose consultation arrangement between Singapore, Malaysia, the U.K., Australia and New Zealand which replaced the U.K.'s former military commitment east of Suez. While taking a relatively neutral position with respect to the great powers, Lee is working on what he calls the "poison shrimp principle" of making sure Singapore is not nearly as harmless as its size would suggest. Planning for a self-defense capability began in the mid-1960's, with Israeli advisers. Singapore's armed forces now number about 17,900, and a reserve army is building up through the national service under which all able-bodied young men are drafted for 2 to 3 years of active duty followed by 10 years of ready reserve status. Lee maintains that Singapore must have enough "thrust" to escape the "orbit" of the Five Power Arrangement whenever it chooses or needs to do so.

Singapore's own internal security problems are held firmly under control. Its Internal Security Department has an excellent record for keeping track of potential subversion, and the efficient police force, backed by an increasingly well-trained army, should have no difficulty in maintaining order. A major concern of Singapore will be whether or not its neighbor, Malaysia, can cope with its own racial problems and with its resurgent Communist threat.

Singapore's participation in regional political activities is circumspect, and its relations with the neighboring states are not those of mutual trust and confidence. Singapore's leaders tend to be aggressive and sometimes abrasive; outsiders sometimes feel patronized, as though Lee were saying pointedly that with intelligent leadership any country can solve its problems. One observer has commented, "In Singapore it is possible to get people to do things by telling them." Such simple techniques, however, are not effective all over Southeast Asia. Both sides of the relationship are cautious, and Lee and his advisers are aware that the leaders of Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines—who have their own Chinese problems—are reluctant to get too involved with so dynamic a state, directed by Overseas Chinese.

Singapore now stands as a strong, viable, and stable presence in Southeast Asia, and its leaders regard the future with confidence. They have shown Asia and the world what an island of Overseas Chinese can do when they are free to govern their own affairs. The ethnic minorities, too, may feel a certain pride, for they participate to a limited extent in the leadership. But it is well understood that this is really a triumph of the Singapore Chinese.

Chronology (u/ou)

1819

British settlement is established by Sir Stamford Raffles.

1867
April

Straits Settlements (Singapore, Penang, and Malacca) become Crown Colony.

1942
February

Singapore succumbs to Japanese attack.

1945
September

British recover Singapore.

1946
April

Singapore becomes a separate British crown colony.

1959
May

People's Action Party, led by Lee Kuan Yew, wins general election, capturing 43 of the 51 seats in Parliament and receiving 53.4% of the popular vote.

June

Singapore is granted internal self-government; defense and foreign relations are retained by United Kingdom.

1963
September

Malaysia is formally inaugurated; confrontation with Indonesia follows.

People's Action Party wins general election, capturing 37 of the 51 seats in Singapore Parliament and receiving 47% of the popular vote.

1964
July

Communal riots erupt between Chinese and Malays.

September

Further communal disturbances flare up but are kept under control by police and security forces.

1965
August

Singapore is forced to withdraw from Malaysia and becomes an independent nation.

1967
July

United Kingdom announces plan to withdraw its military forces from Southeast Asia by the mid-1970's.

August

Singapore is one of the founding members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

1968
January

United Kingdom advances to late 1971 the date for withdrawal of its military forces from Southeast Asia.

April

People's Action Party wins all 58 seats in Parliament.

1971
April

Five Power Defense Arrangement (Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom) signed.

October

Departure of last British forces (less Five Power contingent) ends 150 years of British-provided defense.

1972
September

People's Action Party wins all 65 seats in Parliament.

Area Brief*

LAND:

Size: 225 sq. mi.

Use: 37% built up area, roads, railroads, and airfields; 21% agriculture; 42% other

WATER:

Limits of territorial waters (claimed): 3 n. mi.

Coastline: 120 mi.

PEOPLE:

Population: 2,163,000 (est. January 1973)

Ethnic divisions: 76.2% Chinese; 15% Malay; 7% Indians (including Pakistanis and Ceylonese); others, 1.8%

Religion: Majority of Chinese adhere to a syncretic blend of Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism; Malays are nearly all Muslims; Indians are Hindu, Muslim, or Sikh; about 100,000–150,000 Christians

Language: Malay is the national language; Malay, English, Mandarin Chinese, and Tamil are official languages

Literacy: 70% of population age 10 and over

GOVERNMENT:

Legal name: Republic of Singapore

Type: Republic within British Commonwealth since separation from Malaysia in August 1965

Legal system: Based on English common law; constitution based on preindependence State of Singapore constitution; legal education at University of Singapore; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction

Branches: Ceremonial President; executive power exercised by Prime Minister and cabinet responsible to unitary legislature (Parliament)

Government leaders: President, Dr. Benjamin Sheares; Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew

Suffrage: Universal for those age 21 and over; voting compulsory

Elections: Normally every 5 years

Political parties and leaders: Government—People's Action Party (PAP), Lee Kuan Yew; opposition—Barisan Sosialis Singapura (BSS), Dr. Lee Siew Choh; Workers' Party, J. B. Jeyaretnam; Communist Party illegal

Voting strength (1972 election): PAP won all 65 seats in Parliament and received 70% of vote; remaining 30% divided among numerous opposition parties or groups

Communist: 200–500; BSS infiltrated by Communists

Member of: ADB, ASEAN, Colombo Plan, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ILO, IMCO, IMF, ITU, SEAMEO, U.N., UNESCO, UPU, WHO, WMO

ECONOMY:

GDP: $2.3 billion (1971), $1,100 per capita; 14% average annual real growth

Agriculture: Occupies negligible position in the economy; imports all rice requirements and most other food products; self-sufficient only in pork, poultry, and eggs

Fishing: Catch, 14,000 metric tons (1971); fish imports, 54,000 metric tons (1971)

Major industries: Petroleum refining, rubber processing, shipbuilding and ship repair, food processing, textiles and clothing, electronic equipment

Electric power: 1971—installed capacity, 706,000 kw.; 2.6 billion kw.-hr. produced (C)

Exports: $1.6 billion (1970), $1.8 billion (1971); petroleum products, processed rubber, manufactured goods

Imports: $2.5 billion (1970), $2.8 billion (1971); crude petroleum, machinery and transport equipment, food products, rubber

Monetary conversion rate: 2.80 Singapore dollars = US$1.00
Fiscal year: 1 April–31 March

COMMUNICATIONS:

Railroads: 24 miles of meter gage (3′3⅜″) single track; 16 miles owned by Malaysian Government, 8 miles jointly owned by Malaysian Government and the Economic Development Board of Singapore; all operated by Malayan Railway Administration (Malaysia)

Highways: 1,226 miles; 773 miles paved (mostly bituminous surface), 243 miles crushed stone, 210 miles improved earth

Ports: 3 major (Singapore, Sembawang, Jurong)

Merchant marine: 143 ships (1,000 g.r.t. or over) totaling 763,338 g.r.t., 1,022,918 d.w.t.; 5 passenger, 95 cargo, 19 combination passenger-cargo, 12 tankers, 7 bulk cargo, 2 refrigerator, and 3 specialized carriers (S)

Civil air: 1 scheduled air carrier, Singapore Airlines, and 1 passenger and cargo charter operator, Saber Air (Pte), Ltd.; 15 major transport aircraft

Airfields: 5 total, 5 usable; 4 with permanent-surface runways; 2 with runways 8,000–11,000 feet, 2 with runways 4,000–7,999 feet; 1 seaplane station

Telecommunications: Adequate domestic facilities; good international service; good radio and television broadcast coverage; about 189,847 telephones; about 268,000 licensed radio sets and 193,120 TV sets; 5 AM broadcast transmit-

*Unless otherwise indicated, data are Unclassified/Official Use Only.

ters; 4 FM transmitters; 2 TV transmitters; 1 satellite ground station; submarine cables extend to East and West Malaysia and to Australia via East Malaysia and Hong Kong

DEFENSE FORCES:

Military manpower: Males, 15–49, 575,000, 390,000 fit for military service

External defense: Provided by loose Five Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA) which replaced Anglo-Malayan Defense Agreement of 1957; FPDA, effective since 1 November 1970, also provides for small ANZUK Joint Force composed of Australia, New Zealand, and United Kingdom ground, naval, and air headquarters in Singapore; Royal Malaysian Navy home-based in Singapore

Personnel: Army, 14,500, Maritime Command 1,000; paramilitary and reserve forces, including police, 38,500 (S)

Major ground units: 3 infantry brigades comprising 10 infantry battalions (6 regular and 4 active reserve), 1 artillery command of 3 battalion-size units (2 in cadre strength only), 1 armored brigade with 1 tank battalion and 2 APC battalions, 1 commando battalion, 1 engineer battalion (reserve), 1 signal battalion (S)

Ships: 7 gunboats, 1 LST, 4 LCM, 1 service craft (C)

Supply: Produces some small arms ammunition, rifles, and quartermaster-type individual equipment; prototypes of gunboats and guided-missile boats built in U.K. and West Germany, respectively; remainder of two classes locally built; all other materiel imported, mainly from U.K. and U.S. (C)

Military budget: For fiscal year ending 31 March 1973, $248.9 million; 27% of total national budget (C)

Places and features referred to in this General Survey (U/OU)

	COORDINATES			COORDINATES	
	° 'N.	° 'E.		° 'N.	° 'E.
Alor Setar, Malaysia	6 07	100 22	Pulau Ayer Chawan (*isl*)	1 16	103 42
Bedok	1 19	103 57	Pulau Brani (*isl*)	1 16	103 50
Bukit Batok (*hill*)	1 21	103 46	Pulau Bukum (*isl*)	1 14	103 46
Bukit Gombak (*hill*)	1 22	103 46	Pulau Bukum Kechil (*isl*)	1 14	103 46
Bukit Timah (*hill*)	1 21	103 47	Queenstown	1 18	103 48
Bukit Timah Village	1 20	103 47	Sabah, Malaysia (*admin div*)	5 30	117 00
Caldecott Hill Estate	1 20	103 50	Sarawak, Malaysia (*admin div*)	2 30	113 30
Changi	1 23	103 59	Selat Sembilan (*strait*)	1 18	103 42
East Lagoon (*bay*)	1 16	103 51	Sembawang	1 27	103 50
Fort Canning (*fort*)	1 18	103 51	Senoko, Sungai (*strm*)	1 28	103 49
Gemas, Malaysia	2 35	102 37	Sentosa (*isl*), formerly Pulau Blakang Mati	1 15	103 50
Geylang	1 19	103 53	Serangoon	1 22	103 54
Geylang Serai	1 19	103 54	Singapore	1 17	103 51
Inner Roads (*roadstead*)	1 17	103 51	Singapore Island (*isl*)	1 22	103 48
Johor Baharu, Malaysia	1 28	103 45	Singapore Strait (*strait*)	1 15	104 00
Johore Strait (*strait*)	1 28	103 48	Tanglin (*rr station*)	1 18	103 48
Jurong	1 19	103 43	Tanjong Pagar (*point*)	1 16	103 51
Kalang	1 20	103 52	Tanjong Rhu (*point*)	1 18	103 52
Kalang River (*strm*)	1 18	103 52	Telok Blangah	1 17	103 49
Kampong Kembangan	1 19	103 55	Toa Payoh	1 20	103 51
Kampong Kranji	1 26	103 45	Tuas	1 19	103 39
Kampong Ubi	1 19	103 54	Woodlands	1 27	103 46
Keppel Harbour (*harbor*)	1 16	103 50	Yio Chu Kang	1 23	103 51
Kuala Sungai Johor, Malaysia (*strm mouth*)	1 27	104 02			
Malay Peninsula (*peninsula*)	6 00	102 00	**Selected airfields**		
Mount Faber (*hill*)	1 16	103 49			
Outer Roads (*roadstead*)	1 17	103 52	Changi	1 23	103 59
Pasir Panjang Village	1 18	103 46	Seletar	1 25	103 52
Paya Lebar	1 21	103 53	Singapore	1 21	103 55
Pinang, Malaysia	5 25	100 20	Tengah	1 23	103 43

(1)



501015 3-73

Central Intelligence Agency **For Official Use Only**







Summary Map

(3)

SECRET

SECRET